by Aaron Wood
Abstract
Following independence from the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the main concern for Lithuania was achieving energy independence. While this was achieved in part through the use of Ignalina NPP, it would prevent the development of liberalized markets and accession to the European Union. This article will show through a historical recount, how Lithuania made temporary sacrifices in energy independence in order to develop a more liberalized energy market, through which it has been able to secure a variety of suppliers, and by extension, energy security. The new developments allowed for covering lacking power generation capacity through imports, as well as diversifying sources of natural gas for gas-fired domestic power generation. Lithuania, in securing its energy supplies, has chosen a path far from straightforward.
Key words: nuclear power; Russian gas; LNG; European Union; Baltic energy; liberalization.
In 1990, Lithuania started its path as a newly independent state, in charge of national energy policy and energy security strategy. Following independence from the Soviet Union, Lithuania gained an important asset, the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), which allowed the small Baltic nation to be self-sufficient in providing a vast majority of its electricity demand and place itself in a stronger position with Russia in regards to energy dependency. However, in order to join the European Union, Brussels demanded the plant be closed. Protestations from the Seimas (Lithuanian legislature) were of no effect, with EU leadership remaining firm in the closure of Ignalina NPP, making it a caveat for assimilation into the European Union.
As a result, Lithuania unwillingly became more reliant on Russian natural gas for electricity generation as few alternatives were left available. However, given recent events we can see that the political will for diversification away from Russian gas has remained in Lithuania, vis-à-vis the LNG project that is currently being realized on the Baltic Coast and recent developments in electro-connectivity with Europe.
In this paper, I examine the fallout from the decision to integrate with the EU while sacrificing energy independence from Russia. I examine the perceived trade-offs and why Lithuania eventually chose the path to integration, despite becoming more dependent on Russian natural gas. Lastly, I examine whether post-integration Lithuania has succeeded in securing other means of energy independence from Russian gas and whether these are not simply related to, but a result of the liberalization goals set by the EU. I argue that despite the temporary loss in energy independence due to the shutdown of Ignalina NPP, Lithuania has been able to achieve energy independence because of EU integration and liberalization efforts.
Energy Independence Through Nuclear Power
While struggling for its independence, Lithuania dealt with the expected politicization of gas and supplies from the Soviet Union, which fueled a desire to move away from dependence on Russia in terms of politics and well as energy. Lithuania was forced to find creative means to achieve that. The country was not a significant transit state for gas deliveries, and the general feeling among Lithuanian policy makers was that Russia could not be trusted to deliver hydrocarbons. Although Lithuanian politicians were largely opposed to nuclear power generation following the disaster at Chernobyl, upon the realization of independence, despite a lack of a unified voice in Lithuanian parliament in many other regards, there was wide, multi-partisan support for using nuclear energy as means of gaining energy independence from Russia. Ignalina NPP would serve as this crucial asset in the early days of Lithuania’s independence for guaranteeing security and avoiding full energy dependence. Ignalina provided nearly 80% of electricity in Lithuania 1994-2004.[1]
Figure 1. Power generation in Lithuania
Source: IEA.
Despite running on an isotope produced only in Russia, RMBK type fuel, and being run by a mostly Russian team at the time of Lithuanian independence, Lithuania was able to move swiftly enough to secure the plant and not allow it to fall to political pressures and be used as a pawn by the Soviet Union in its last days, and the Russian Federation in its first ones. The Russian crew that was ‘grandfathered in’ with the plant was offered Lithuanian citizenship and highly competitive salaries in an effort to make them stay in Lithuania with their technical expertise. It was largely successful. Even the director of the plant, Victor Shevaldin, was retained and was even given a vote of confidence by the Lithuanian Finance Minister when embroiled in a tax scandal. He stayed until the plant closed in 2009.[2]
Ignalina NPP was originally built as an effort to supply the entire Baltic region under the Soviet Union (for location and connections to the electricity grid, see Figure 2), and it had been ‘lost’ by the USSR and the Russian Federation following Lithuanian independence. Lithuania could use its newly gained asset to its advantage. In order to increase its power relative to Russia, Lithuania traded electricity via existing Russian infrastructure to Kaliningrad in exchange for the uniquely Russian isotope of fuel they needed. In this way, Lithuania was able to secure some form of energy security. The ease of providing reliable power to Kaliningrad through contracts with Lithuania was enough to assuage the Russian government to not interfere with delivery of necessary isotopes.
Ignalina: Obstacle to Liberalization?
While Lithuania was building its government and establishing itself as a sovereign nation, in 1992 the European Union was making efforts to greater liberalize the electricity and natural gas infrastructure within Europe. Much of the existing infrastructure of the day was the result of initiatives guided towards self sufficiency at the national level and did not take into consideration the supply and demand differences of neighboring countries.[3]
By integrating national markets, the EU sought to increase efficiency and match supply and demand through creating a unified market. While the Ingalina NPP provided an important element of energy independence, especially in the early days after Lithuanian independence, it was not able to participate in the liberalized markets that were being constructed in the European Union.
First, electricity is hardly a fungible source of energy. It was very limited in its application to transport and the lack of connections to Europe and insufficient storage facilities made it difficult to trade. Also, Lithuania still relied on Russian infrastructure to the deliver the power, an element that limited its level of energy independence. Existing infrastructure from Soviet times only allowed for transmission between Russia, the Baltic States, and Kaliningrad. While remaining self-sufficient, this limited the degree to which Lithuanian electricity could participate in a liberalized market.[4]
Figure 2. Lithuania’s electricity grid
Source: Litgrid (2016), Grid Development: Electricity Transmission Grid Ten-Year Development Plan. Available at: http://www.litgrid.eu/index.php/grid-development-/electricity-transmission-grid-ten-year-development-plan/134# [Accessed 23 February 2016].
In the early 1990s Lithuania, by geological and historical default, could not participate in a liberalized electricity market. Ignalina essentially provided all of the country’s electricity, effectively creating a domestic monopoly. The little trade in electricity that did exist, transmission to Kaliningrad and the other Baltic States, was based on long-term contracts and an exchange for RMBK isotopes. As a result, prices were not liberalized and were set in a political environment rather than by market forces.
Lithuania’s First Steps in Liberalizing Electricity
While Europe attempted to create an integrated and open electricity market, albeit somewhat unsuccessfully through the first liberalization packages, Lithuania would institute a series of reforms. Initially, the road to reform was slow. The former communists, known as the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party following independence, controlled the Seimas from 1992-1996. Under the LDLP the Litas was formed, but unprofitable industries were kept running via public subsidy, and eventually Lithuania began to lag behind its Baltic neighbors in terms of development. With the victory of the Conservative Party/Homeland Union in 1996, developments could begin in earnest such as opening to foreign direct investment (FDI). In 1996-97, Lithuania saw nearly triple growth in FDI as positive legislation was passed in the Seimas.[5]
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, political momentum and public interest were building toward integration with the European Union. In April of 2000, 42% of Lithuanians favored integration.[6] With the formation of a coalition government in 2001, Lithuanian policy makers began in earnest to implement liberal policy measures in concert with the EU that would liberalize price structures and open up Lithuanian markets, especially in regards to electricity generation.
In 1997, Lithuania created the independent National Control Commission for Prices and Energy (NCCPE). This Board would set energy prices based on market and economic principles not only in electricity, but in district heat, water and natural gas, all industries where there was serious lack of competition. Measures were also taken to coincide with EU liberalization requirements for integration following the invitation to Lithuania to participate in the European Council summit in Helsinki in 1999. In order to ensure the implementation of the EU’s Energy and Gas Initiatives, the Seimas passed the Law on Gas in 2001, and the Law on Electricity in 2002. These pieces of legislation assured third party access to previously monopolized systems. The Law on Gas saw an increase in the number of consumers that were theoretically able to choose a supplier.[7] The Law on Electricity also met unbundling goals as the national company Lietuvos Energija was separated into generation, transmission, and distribution companies. Prices went up marginally for domestic consumers as prices began to be set on the costs of transmission and distribution.
To this point, we see Lithuania’s relative success in liberalizing internal markets, especially considering that little infrastructure existed to tie it to the rest of the continent. Joining the continent, particularly through integration with the European Union, would come at a cost however. Following the liberalization efforts of Lithuania, including the privatization of Mazeiku Nafta (national oil company) and Lietuvos Dujos (national gas company), was the debate with EU officials over the future of Ignalina.
Ignalina: Fallout
Primary among the concerns of EU officials was the type of reactor being used. The RMBK fuel type reactor was notorious in that it was the same type of fuel used in the Chernobyl reactors. RMBK was rather popular and some plants still exist in Europe today, albeit with security and safety upgrades, which are expensive and can take years to implement and complete. The obvious monopoly of power that the nuclear power plant created in Lithuania was also of concern to European officials. As we have observed, Lithuanian energy demand was well met by the NPP and the comfort of selfsufficiency in this regard was damaging to any possible moves to liberalization and security through diversity, which were primary goals for European electricity markets via the European Union’s liberalization efforts. In short, the plant was both perceived as too dangerous, and not sufficient to meeting liberalization requirements of member states to continue to be allowed to operate.[8]
Those opposed argued that the plant had been crucial and would remain crucial in assuring independence from Russian energy. They also argued that the price of energy, electricity, hot water, etc., would all increase even more dramatically as Russian gas prices were increasing at the time. Despite protests to its closing, the Lithuanian government went ahead with the deal. They agreed to close the first reactor by 2004. Having agreed to this much, Lithuanian officials had hoped to assuage Brussels to agree to keeping the second reactor open and operational. The second reactor alone still provided for 70% of Lithuania’s electricity after the closing of the first. Brussels insisted that the safety standards were not up to European standards and held firm. Despite lengthy negotiations and much sturm und drang from the Seimas, the plant was entirely shut down in 2009.[9]
The EU is currently providing financial assistance to safely close and decommission the plant. The EU recognizes that:
“…the decommissioning of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant with two 1500 MW RBMK-type reactor units inherited from the former Soviet Union is of an unprecedented nature and represents for Lithuania an exceptional financial burden not commensurate with the size and economic strength of the country and that this decommissioning will continue beyond the Community’s current Financial Perspective […]” – Protocol No. 4 of the Accession Treaty of Lithuania to the European Union.[10]
The cost will be substantial indeed. In the period from 2014-2020, the EU will provide EUR 1.12 billion to decommission the plant, having already allocated EUR 1.4 billion from the closing till 2014.[11] The fallout in terms of human capital and energy security, was substantial. The Ignalina region itself suffered as the four thousand workers who were employed at the plant lost their jobs. Demonstrations took place in the city, decrying the government for abandoning its people to higher energy prices and joblessness. Financially, the cost of heating, electricity, and hot water all increased as Lithuania was forced to import more gas for gasfired power stations. Electricity costs alone went up by 30%, and that which they could not produce, had to be imported from Russia.[12] This happened in the midst of increases in the price of Russian gas from USD 85 per thousand cubic meters in 2005 to USD 345 in 2008. Lithuania became entirely reliant on Russian for its energy supply.[13]
In a measure to regain energy independence and in hopes to mitigate the increased projected future cost of gas electricity generation, Lithuania planned to construct a newer, modern nuclear power station that was not reliant on a Russian isotope of fuel. Plans for such are mentioned in the Lithuanian Energy Strategy of 2007.
“Key problems include the long-term reliability of natural gas supply, construction of the prospective new nuclear power plant and integration of the electricity system into EU systems. Implementation of these strategic tasks could be facilitated only by close cooperation with other Baltic countries – Estonia, Latvia and Poland.”[14]
Figure 3. Lithuania’s primary energy consumption by fuel
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2015 (workbook).
A possible Baltic project in tandem with Poland was proposed but failed as concerns over price and location of infrastructure chipped away at commitment. Poland was also concerned that the availability of cheaper nuclear energy could harm its domestic coal industry. Estonia and Belarus also announced plans to build their own NPP. Particularly disastrous to Lithuania’s NPP hopes was the announcement of a new NPP to be built in Kaliningrad. Electricity sales to the region were a major cost factor of Lithuania’s new NPP plans. With no co-investors, the plan was not economically viable for Lithuania.
The closure of the plant and the subsequent price increases could not have come at a worse time for Lithuanian consumers. The global financial crisis of 2008 hit Lithua nia especially hard. Lithuania’s GDP sank dramatically from 9.8% annual growth in 2007 to -14.7% in 2009. [15] The Lithuanian economy shrank overall by 22.4%, the worst in the EU.[16] FDI plummeted from USD 1,900 million in 2008 to just under USD 18 million in 2009.[17] Austerity measures were implemented, and domestic industry suffered as a result of a lack of investment. Export industries however, remained producing incredibly well. This was more in spite of austerity measures than because of them, as the decrease in wages allowed exporting firms to gain a wider profit margin on exported goods.[18] The Lithuanian government stepped up its use of EU funds, sharply raising its absorption of such grants from EUR 1.2 billion in 2008 to EUR 1.75 billion in 2009, that is, from 3.7% of GDP to 6.6% of GDP.[19] This in combination with a still growing export industry contributed to growth and recovery in the Lithuanian economy.
At the end of the 2000’s, Lithuania, despite making moves toward liberalization, had still not managed to diversify sufficiently in terms of sources of supply. While the country recovered from the economic crisis and GDP recovered, they were still wholly dependent on Russian gas at increased prices being sold via long-term contracts. Lithuania suffered terrible losses both financially and in terms of energy security. Despite its difficult way toward recovery (energy consumption never returned to pre-crisis level, see Figure 3), Lithuania has not lost sight of its goals to diversify and become energy independent in the framework of liberalization set forth by the EU.
Security Through Liberalization
In the subsequent energy strategies set forth by the Seimas from 2007 onward, the language reflects a strong prioritization of energy security and strictly adhering to the liberalization goals set forward by the European Union, stating that it is a matter of “national security”. The Strategy also very narrowly defined liberalization goals to be absolutely in accord with those set forth by the European Commission, by updating outdated directives from the Commission and passing domestic legislation that is completely in line with the new directives. In general, the Seimas, while still relying on coalition governments as no single party is popular enough to attain the majority, enjoys broad support for staunch adherence to its obligations and goals in the EU.[20]
One such requirement for Lithuania was to secure alternative gas supply by December 3, 2014. This measure, in an effort to ensure that Lithuanian efforts at liberalized gas networks were not underutilized, also addressed the importance of energy security through acquiring different sources of energy. While natural gas companies in Lithuania had been unbundled as part of the liberalization measures in the early 2000s, they still relied not only on one exporter for gas, i.e. Gazprom, but on one pipeline that entered Lithuania via Belarus. The desire for more diversification of gas supplies in combination with the increasing price of natural gas made LNG a viable option and as a result Lithuania started its first LNG project at the port of Klaipėda.[21]
In addition to domestic efforts by Lithuania to align its domestic legislation with EU regulation, the EU started initiatives to promote the liberalization of electricity and gas in the Baltics. Notable of these was the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) as it would set out to define and reaffirm among member states a shared set of goals towards integration in the Baltic. BEMIP provided a platform of cooperation for member states, contractually binding them through Memoranda of Understanding, Actions Plans, and keeping policy makers updated with the latest developments in EU programs to support the region.
The goals of BEMIP were ambitious. Based on a 10% mini- mum standard of electro-interconnectivity, the initiative aims to remove cross-border restrictions to the trade of energy, reduce electricity congestion across borders and establish common energy reserves, remove regulated energy tariffs, fully open the retail market, and establish a common power exchange in the Nordic and Baltic areas. In addition to these efforts in electricity, the Plan called for the implementation of reverse flows such as through the proposed Amber PolLit pipeline between Poland and Lithuania, LNG facilities in Estonia and Latvia, and gas storage facilities in Latvia. Two projects that are crucial for the development of Lithuanian energy security have been realized under the auspices of this project.[22]
First, Klaipėda LNG FSRU was a huge step in furthering energy independence for Lithuania. The Floating Storage and Regasification Unit is currently being rented from the Norwegian company Höegh LNG Ltd, and is strategically located in one of the few warm water ports in Baltic so that it can receive shipments year round. The first shipment of LNG arrived there in February 2016.[23] It can store between 15-30 days’ worth of natural gas for priority consumers in a time of emergency and at maximum capacity the facility can import 4 bcm of gas per annum, which is enough to satisfy 75% of all gas demand in the Baltic States.[24]
While there are still fewer suppliers of LNG than oil, it is more comparable to oil as its fungible nature allows it to be imported from a variety of suppliers. By participating in the LNG market, Lithuania hopes to be able to secure LNG in a global market, with price dic tated by global market forces, rather than by the conditions of a long-term contract. Lithuania in the past year has been searching as far afield as North America for LNG supply.[25]
Another means by which Lithuania has expanded its energy security while simultaneously participating in a liberalized market is its very recent developments in electro-connectivity to the integrated EU market. On December 14, 2015, with the inauguration of NordBalt electricity connector with Sweden and its LitPol Link with Poland, Lithuania has permanent energy links going westward (Figure 4). This program is incredibly important not only because Lithuania now has a permanent link in which its electricity generation can compete and therefore be priced by market forces, but it also has a permanent link away from the Russian northwest electro-transmission system known as BRELL (Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), upon which it had been dependent following the closure of Ignalina NPP.[26]
Figure 4. BEMIP connections
Source: [European Commission, 2016].
Both of these projects received critical funding from various EU initiatives in order for them to be realized. LitPol Link featured on the Commission’s list of Projects of Common Interest, which gave it access to a EUR 27.4 million Connecting Europe Facility grant for works carried out in Lithuania. It also benefitted from the EU’s structural funds for construction works carried out in Poland, a loan from the European Investment Bank of EUR 55 million and a Nordic Investment Bank loan of EUR 50 million.[27]
While the Klaipėda platforms rent must be paid for by Lithuania itself, the EU’s Innovation Network Executive Agency (INEA) provided financial support for the construction of the KlaipėdaKuršenai gas transmission pipeline, which was completed in October of 2015. The project received EUR 27.6 million under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) program.[28] The pipeline was designed to create sufficient capacity so that regasified LNG from Klaipėda LNG FSRU can be distributed to domestic facilities in Lithuania as well as to other states in the Baltic.
This financial support from the EU is especially important for Lithuania as the expense of renting the LNG platform begins to mount up. At EUR 151, 500 per day to rent the platform, the burden on the Lithuania national budget is huge. A total of EUR 521 million will have to be paid to Höegh LNG for the lease. Funding from the EU will be critical for Lithuania to maintain the high cost of renting the platform in order to maintain energy security.[29]
Figure 5. Lithuania’s gross inland energy consumption, mtoe
Source: Eurostat.
In these important examples, we see that the EU has provided a vital framework in which Lithuania has been able to not only plan and coordinate with fellow member states, but also receive funding and information for its projects to be realized. It has been able to do this so successfully because of a popular consensus among policy makers that integration with the EU and its energy security measures is concomitant with Lithuanian national security. Lithuania has achieved the ability to meet its energy demands through a fungible resource, LNG, sold on the world market, and purchase electricity at competitive prices from its neighbors in Europe. So overall, the gross inland energy consumption has actually remained rather stable (Figure 5), unlike the supply picture that we have seen above (Figure 1, Figure 3).
Conclusion
Lithuania has navigated a long road in order to achieve energy independence and success through liberalization. With the initial successes of the Ignalina NPP in providing energy security to the Baltic nation, there were tradeoffs in regards to possibilities for integration and liberalization in a larger market. The supposed benefit of entering the EU for reasons of economic security outweighed the degree to which Lithuania would need to rely on Russia for its energy consumption, and despite protests from people and lawmakers alike, the majority decided to close Ignalina in favor of integration.
Following recovery from a crippling economic crisis, the Lithuanian government strictly adhered to its obligations to integrate with the European Union by codifying integration efforts related to energy into their energy policy and acknowledging the possibility of achieving energy security through integration and diversification. In turn the EU set an overarching initiative, the BEMIP, to provide a platform on which policymakers from the Baltic and Nordic states could meet to coordinate efforts to integrate into a common European market. They also provided substantial financial assistance when Lithuania was recovering from a crippling economic crisis in order to help fund these ambitious projects, which was critical for a small nation like Lithuania. As a result of coordination efforts with the EU and its member states, Lithuania has been able to become, and looks to become, more energy secure in the future. This is exemplified through the NordBalt electricity project. Lithuania imported 70% of its electricity from Russia in 2014, but following the realization of NordBalt, new connectivity will result in an additional 1,200 megawatts of capacity, allowing Lithuania to meet 66% of its energy needs from sources outside of Russia via European markets.[30] This is a substantial step forward in breaking from the BRELL electro-connectivity infrastructure which is perceived to be controlled by Moscow.
At the basis of Lithuania’s energy policy lies its political decision to distance itself from Russia and integrate into the European region. Thus, the rhetoric of energy security in this country follows what is often heard in Brussels and evolves around the necessity to decrease dependence on Russian supplies. After the closure of the Ignalina NPP, requested by the EU in the process of Lithuania’s assimilation and on the basis of its technical characteristics, Lithuania has found itself in a position of being even more dependent on Russian supplies of hydrocarbons than ever. This was the reason for pushing ahead with LNG import terminal in Klaipeda. Throughout the past years, Lithuania has both constructed the terminal and developed electricity grid connections with Poland and Sweden, thus smoothing the effect of Ignalina NPP decommissioning: these new developments allowed for covering lacking power generation capacity through imports, as well as diversifying sources of natural gas for gasfired domestic power generation. Lithuania, in securing its energy supplies, has chosen a path far from straightforward.
Aaron Wood
MA candidate in Energy Policy at the European University in St. Petersburg; managing editor of the ENERPO Newsletter. Aaron holds a BA in Political Science and Russian Studies from Luther College.
Address for correspondence: awood@eu.spb.ru
[1] Balmaceda, M. (2013), The Politics of Energy Dependency: Belarus, and Lithuania between Domestic Ukraine, Oligarchs and Russian Pressure. Toronto: University of Toronto.
[2] Balmaceda, M. (2013), The Politics of Energy Dependency: Belarus, and Lithuania between Domestic Ukraine, Oligarchs and Russian Pressure. Toronto: University of Toronto.
[3] EU Communication from the Commission to the Council 1992/553 Final on Electricity and Natural Gas Transmission
[4] Balmaceda, M. (2013), The Politics of Energy Dependency: Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania between Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure. Toronto: University of Toronto.
[5] Runewicz, M. (2002), “The Inflows of Foreign Direct Investments into Lithuania: Main Determinants, Trends and Developments 1996-2002.” IDM Studien 1. Available at: http://www.tiger.edu.pl/onas/runiewicz/inflows.pdf [Accessed 20 March 2016].
[6] Mažylis, L., and Unikaite, I. (2003), Referendum Briefing No8: The Lithua- nian EU Accession Referendum 10-11 May 2003. European Parties Election and Referendums Network at University of Sussex. Available at: https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=epern-ref-no-8.pdf&site=266 [Accessed 19 December 2015].
[7] Balmaceda, M. (2013), The Politics of Energy Dependency: Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania between Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure. Toronto: University of Toronto.
[8] Štreimikiene, D. (2015), Lithuania. In: UN Energy Indicators for Sustainable Development, ed. 2013. 129-92. Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/energy_indicators/chapter5.pdf [Accessed 19 December 2015].
[9] World Nuclear News, (2010), Lithuania Shuts Ignalina Plant. World Nu- clear News, 4 January. Available at: http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/NP-Lithuania_shuts_Ignalina_plant-0401104.html [Accessed 19 December 2015].
[10] Ivanica, M. (2003), An Overview of the Treaty of Accession of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia to the European Union. [working paper] EIPA. Available at: http://publications.eipa.eu/en/details/show/&tid=1708 [Accessed 18 December 2015].
[11] Anon, (2015), Financing in 2014-2020. Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant.
Available at: http://www.iae.lt/en/financing-2014-202/ [Accessed 18 December 2015].
[12] Štreimikiene, D. (2015), Lithuania. In: UN Energy Indicators for Sustainable Development, ed. 2013. 129-92. Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/energy_indicators/chapter5.pdf [Accessed 19 December 2015].
[13] Balmaceda, M. (2013), The Politics of Energy Dependency: Ukraine, Belarus, and Lithuania between Domestic Oligarchs and Russian Pressure. Toronto: University of Toronto.
[14] Lithuanian Energy Institute, 2003. National Energy Strategy. Minister of Energy. Available at: http://web.stanford.edu/class/msande290/LEI03%20NAtl%20Energy%20Strat.pdf [Accessed 20 December 2015].
[15] World Bank, (2015), GDP at Market Prices 2006-2010. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?page=1 [Accessed 20 December 2015].
[16] World Bank, (2015), Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows 2006-2010. Available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD/countries?page=1 [Accessed 20 December 2015].
[17] Seputyte, M. (2009), Lithuanian Economy Shrank 22.4%, EU’s Worst Recession. Bloomberg. 28 July. Available at: http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread486162/pg1 [Accessed 18 December 2015].
[18] Aspen Institute Prague, (2013), Austerity the Lithuanian Way. Available at: http://www.aspeninstitute.cz/en/article/3-2013-austerity-the-lithuanian-way/ [Accessed 19 December 2015].
[19] Åslund, A., (2011), Lithuania’s Remarkable Recovery. EU Observer. 28 November. Available at: https://euobserver.com/opinion/114419 [Accessed 19 December 2015].
[20] Lithuanian Energy Institute, (2003), National Energy Strategy. Minister of Energy. Available at: http://web.stanford.edu/class/msande290/LEI03%20NAtl%20Energy%20Strat.pdf [Accessed 20 December 2015].
[21] Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, (2012), LNG Terminal Project in Lithuania in Conference on Energy Security: Outlook & Perspectives in the Baltic Sea Region. Available at: http://www.lei.lt/energy-security-conference/index_files/Masiulis.pdf [Accessed 15 December 2015].
[22] European Commission, (2015), Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/baltic-energy-market-interconnection-plan [Accessed 18 December 2015].
[23] NG World News (2016), Lithuania Gets First 2016 LNG Cargo. Available online: https://www.lngworldnews.com/lithuania-gets-first-2016-lng-cargo/ [Accessed 1 March 2016].
[24] Lithuanian Academy of Sciences, (2012), LNG Terminal Project in Lithuania in Conference on Energy Security: Outlook & Perspectives in the Baltic Sea Region. Available at: http://www.lei.lt/energy-security-conference/index_files/Masiulis.pdf [Accessed 15 December 2015].
[25] Adomaitis, N., (2015), Lithuania Signs Non-binding Deal for U.S. LNG. Reuters. 28 February. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/lithuania-lng-usa-idUSL5N0W207O20150228 [Accessed 15 December 2015].
[26] Braw, E., (2015), The Baltic States’ Vital Step Toward Energy Independence. World Affairs Journal. 17 December. Available at: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/elisabeth-braw/baltic-states-vital-step-toward-energy-independence [Accessed 19 December 2015].
[27] European Commission, (2015), Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/baltic-energy-market-interconnection-plan [Accessed 18 December 2015]; European Commission, (2015), New electricity connections between Lithuania, Poland and Sweden create “Baltic Ring”. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/new-electricity-connections-between-lithuania-poland-and-sweden-create-baltic-ring [Accessed 18 December 2015].
[28] Woodward, K., (2015), EU Funding Lithuania Gas Pipeline. LNG Industry, 15 May. Available at: http://www.lngindustry.com/liquid-natural-gas/15052015/EU-funding-for-Lithuanian-LNG-pipeline-760/ [Accessed 18 December 2015].
[29] Vaida, P., (2015), Klaipeda LNG Terminal Already Cost Lithuania EUR 128 Mln. The Baltic Course. 29 May. Available at: http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/energy/?doc=106846 [Accessed 19 December 2015].
[30] Braw, E., (2015), The Baltic States’ Vital Step Toward Energy Independence. World Affairs Journal. 17 December. Available at: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/elisabeth-braw/baltic-states-vital-step-toward-energy-independence [Accessed 19 December 2015].